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Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 30, No. 3, 409-431 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0403000305

Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions

Ad L.W. Vogelaar

Eric-Hans Kramer

Peace operations involving modern armed forces require a system of command in which responsibilities and authorities are delegated throughout the command line: mission command. Although mission command is popular in theory, in practice commanders appear to have problems with the delegation of authority. This study analyzed the practice of mission command in four Dutch case studies. The main analysis shows a relation between the granting of autonomy to subordinate commanders, on the one hand, and the clarity of the objectives, the appropriateness of the means, and the mutual trust between commanders at different levels, on the other. Further analysis shows that the possession of good communication means, the slow pace of operations, the development of routines, the required safety of personnel, the political sensitivity, and the deployment of mixed units are obstacles to mission command as well. The conclusion is that mission command is hard to implement.


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