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Armed Forces & Society
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How Not to Lose in Iraq

A Commentary on Dr. Alice Hills’s "Fear and Loathing in Falluja"

William Locke Hauser

whauser{at}att.net

The author commends Doctor Hills’s analysis but faults her conclusion that America’s involvement in Iraq is essentially different from that in Vietnam. After acknowledging six obvious differences, he goes on to enumerate crucial similarities: three in conflict origin, seven in geopolitical situation, seven in American military characteristics, and two in American national ethos. While praising the courage and skill of American military forces on the ground, he examines past and current strategic theories for countering insurgency and casts doubt on the ability of American forces as presently constituted and employed to succeed. He concludes that the current presidential administration, faced with this situation, is likely to maintain a pretense of success as long as possible and then "bail out" of the conflict, with potentially disastrous consequences for both Middle Eastern stability and American civil-military relations

Key Words: Iraq • insurgency • civil-military relations • strategy

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 4, 640-644 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X06287048


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