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Armed Forces & Society
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Base Motives

The Political Economy of Okinawa’s Antimilitarism

Alexander Cooley

Barnard College, Columbia University ac210{at}columbia.edu

Kimberly Marten

Barnard College, Columbia University km2225{at}columbia.edu

The Japanese prefecture of Okinawa has witnessed a great deal of protest activity against the U.S. military bases on the island. Antibase sentiment is regularly expressed by the local press and the local cultural and educational institutions. A brutal 1995 crime committed by U.S. military personnel on the island inflamed public opinion against the bases. Yet the U.S. base presence endures, and the antibase activity of the late 1990s was defused rather quickly into tacit continuing acceptance by Okinawans of the base presence, even as U.S. bases elsewhere in the world closed in response to protest activity. What explains this puzzle? The authors argue that the Japanese government’s unique system of "burden payments" provides incentives to Okinawans both to highlight the negative effects of the U.S. presence and to support the continuation of the bases for economic reasons. The trilateral base-bargaining relationship serves the interests of Washington, Tokyo, and a politically critical majority of Okinawans themselves

Key Words: Okinawa • military bases • United States • Japan • protest activity

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 4, 566-583 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X05283557
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