This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Web of Science (1) Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Prins, B. C. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Interstate Rivalry and the Recurrence of Crises:A Comparison of Rival and Nonrival Crisis Behavior,1918–1994

Texas Tech University, Department of Political Science, 11 Holden Hall, Lubbock, TX 79409-1015brandon.prins{at}ttu.edu

Research on enduring rivalry has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention in the last few years. As scholars begin to relax assumptions regarding event independence and historical memory, rivalry has emerged to explain dependencies across countries and over time. Despite the evidence to date, some scholars challenge the rivalry distinction and suggest that a stochastic model may explain the distribution of militarized disputes equally as well. However, if the pairings of states that define the list of enduring rivals are fundamentally different than other pairs of states, differences in behavior should be evident in crisis situations. For rival states in crisis, conflict patterns should vary systematically across conflicts. The likelihood of military action should be lower in dispute one compared to dispute six, or eight, or twelve. Moreover, the conflict strategies of rival states in crisis should differ from the conflict strategies of nonrival states in crisis. Using data from the Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the evidence uncovered here supports the conjecture that states in rival contexts tend to behave differently in crises than their nonrival counterparts, although an indirect effect of rivalry is observed as well. Rival states in crisis frequently resort to a military response against nonrivals. The evidence also provides empirical support for the evolutionary model of rivalry, rather than the punctuated equilibrium model.

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 31, No. 3, 323-351 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0503100302


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?