Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Armed Forces & Society
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Parchomenko, W.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Prospects for Genuine Reform in Ukraine's Security Forces

Walter Parchomenko

Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington, D.C., and Atlantic Council of the United States, wparkhom{at}erols.com

Despite a steady increase in official rhetoric about genuine reform in Ukraine's security services, the president and high command of the MOD and non-MOD security forces still do not see a need for dramatic changes in the country's excessive military organization and are not ready for far-reaching reforms. During 2001, defense spending is expected to increase only modestly in absolute terms, once again covering barely 50 percent of the military's needs. Given the harsh economic realities facing the country, and President Kuchma's profound reluctance to press for deep reductions and far-reaching optimization of all security forces, Ukraine in 2005 will likely still have huge, redundant security forces and a poorly trained and equipped military. The military can expect a survivalnot reformbudget well beyond 2005, and personnel cuts beyond those scheduled for the end of 2005 seem inevitable.

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, 279-308 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0202800206


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?