Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Armed Forces & Society
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Web of Science (2)
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Archer, C. I.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Royalist Army of New Spain, 1810-1821: Militarism, Praetorianism, or Protection of Interests?

Christon I. Archer

Department of History, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4.

Although the army of New Spain exhibited few if any signs of praetorianism or militarism prior to the independence wars, 1810-1821, many observers in the decades following national independence described the military as one of the negative impediments to progress in the young Mexican republic. Clearly, the decade of insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and fragmentation of the old polity caused dramatic changes in the attitudes and behavior of army officers. The present article analyzes the impact of the war on the royalist army, which in 1821 largely transformed itself to declare for independence. To develop effective counterinsurgency programs, officers assumed active political and administrative roles. After years of exercising power, they did not wish to return to their barracks.

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 17, No. 1, 99-116 (1990)
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9001700105


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?